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Abstract: Spinoza's moral philosopher represents his most concerted attempt to come to 
terms with the great philosophical questions of the existence and identity of God, the 
nature and origin of the human mind concerning God, the origin and nature of 
emotions, the power of emotions as they restrict freedom of choice. His ethics is 
derived from his metaphysics and psychology. His belief that everything emanates 
from a perfect and infinite God made him conclude that evil does not exist. Further, he 
argues that anything that happens could have happened otherwise since it emanated 
from the unchangeable laws of nature. The surest part of happiness according to 
Spinoza is the study of philosophy and meditation. Arising from the foregoing, this 
discourse views Spinoza's doctrine as running contrary to human nature. For 
maintaining that everything is fated and determined including human disposition 
implies that all human actions can, therefore, be said to be amoral. The corollary o f 
the above is that institutions such as law court, police, prisons, and judiciary, 
Christianity and Islam are superfluous, irrational and serving no purpose. 
Consequently, his postulates smack of a moral lacuna. 
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INTRODUCTION  
This discourse proceeds in the following manner: It begins by examining Spinoza’s 
metaphysics. This deals with his understanding of the nature of the universe. Following his 
metaphysics, it examines Spinoza’s psychology. This is the nexus between his metaphysics 
and his moral philosophy and explains human conduct derived from the nature of the universe. 
Thereafter, it explores Spinoza's moral theory which forms the bulk of this discourse. 
Spinoza's moral theory is, of course, the function of his metaphysics and psychology. This 
article-examines Spinoza’s moral philosophy in the light of its implications. 
 
SPINOZA’S METAPHYSICS  
Spinoza was a monist, pantheist, rationalist, relativist, determinist and fatalist 
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(Nwaorgu, 28). As a monist, he held that there is only one substance, God or Nature. This is 
the only thing that is wholly positive. Existence thought and all other things in existence are 
the attributes of God because He is infinite. He defined substance thus: “by substance, I mean 
that which is in itself and conceived through itself; in other words that of which a conception 
can be formed independently of any other conception” (45). 
This definition of substance here has some similarities with that of Descartes; whereas 
Descartes (126) defined substance as, “that thing, the nature of which can clearly and 
distinctly be understood by itself”; Spinoza added to Descartes’ definition the characteristic of 
substance as that which is in itself (45). Spinoza’s definition of substance as that which is in 
itself gives a deeper meaning to what Spinoza called the cause of itself, that is explained 
through itself and not by reference to any other external cause either for its existence or for its 
attributes and modification.  
For Ekpo (37), Spinoza’s description of substance as one self-existent entity was to avoid 
postulating objects, as Descartes did, as having an independent existence. However, Nidditch 
(189) observes that Spinoza’s concept of substance cannot give the solution or explain the 
nature of things in the universe. He points out that substance may be taken to be mutually 
independent being without the need of another being in which it must cohere to have 
existence. 
The scholastics had contended that substance might be seen in two ways; as a thing-
in. itself and support for other things (Ekpo, 38). This is to say, the primary concept of 
substance, according to the scholastic, is that it is a thing-in-itself and at the same time a 
subject of modification. Thus, for a concrete individual being, it is the substances which make 
it be "what it is" since accidents have no real being or existence of their own except in so far 
as they receive it from the substance of which they are modifications and actualisations.  
Closely linked to Spinoza’s notion of substance is the concept of mode. This term is 
essential in Descartes’s philosophy. Descartes defined mode as that which cannot be 
understood except by the concept of the substance to which it belongs. This is to say that for 
Descartes, the mode is not a real thing; it is only a manner of being, which means it is 
completely dependent on the substance (Bassey et al, 11). Spinoza's notion of mode is that of 
modification of substance. "By mode I understand the modifications (affections) of substance, 
or that which exists in and is conceived through something other than itself (43). Unlike 
Descartes whose notion of mode was something like an accident, Spinoza's saw mode as real 
things. It is important to stress that, for Descartes, there are many substances whereas there is 
only one substance for Spinoza and modes only constitute real things. Spinoza's notion of 
mode can be seen as an instantiation of an individual substance that is dependent on one 
substance. This is because substance perse is incommunicable to any other being since it is the 
unit that contains all parts. Spinoza according to Ekpo (39) writes: “by MODE (modus) I 
understand the modifications (affections) of a substance or that which is something else 
through which it may be conceived.” 
As a rationalist, Spinoza belongs to the school of philosophers that upholds that 
reliable knowledge can only be achieved through reason. His philosophy has been termed the 
zenith of rationalism. In terms of relativism, he submits that good or evil in itself does not 
objectively exist. Nothing is good or evil in itself except as the mind conceives it. Due to 
ignorance, humans term the things which give them pleasure good and those which give them 
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pain as evil, but everything is neutral and derives from God's perfect nature. This leads him to 
determinism. He believes that everything follows a causal chain that emanates from a 
regularity ordered by God. And as a fatalist, he holds that all events happen as a result of 
God’s inscrutable nature and this cannot be otherwise. For him, there is neither free will in the 
mental world nor chance in the physical world. Spinoza according to Albert writes: "all things 
…are in God, and all things which come to pass come to pass solely; through the laws of the 
infinite nature of God and follow… from the necessity of his essence” (157). 
To Spinoza, the Universe, Reality, Nature, and God all mean the same thing. This is 
why he conceives a kind of rational unity in all things which he thinks follow with logical 
necessity from the nature of the whole, so all things have their origin in God. This means that 
God is perfect; evil cannot exist because whatever comes from God cannot be imperfect. 
Spinoza identified God as substance and maintained that God necessarily exists. His 
main thesis is to show that one substance exists completely in itself. This is to say that, God 
neither is communicable to any other being nor does he belong to another. He is the unit and 
contains all parts. He is the ultimate reality to which all perfections of the particular things are 
referred. He possesses His entire nature, is self-contained, and autonomous. He is complete in 
order of essence and existence. His definition must of necessity involve existence; since 
existence pertains to the nature of the substance and therefore from its mere definition, its 
existence is implied. Substance (God) exists, its existence is necessary, as its essence; God's 
existence is, in reality, identical to His essence and God's essence is necessary because to say 
that the necessary essence does not exist is a contradiction. According to Spinoza in The 
Ethics “existence belongs to the nature of substance…cannot be produced by anything, it 
must, therefore,  be its cause…that is, its essence necessarily involves existence or existence 
belongs to its nature” (487). 
From the definition of substance, Spinoza moved to affirm real existence and 
maintained that the denial of its real existence destroys its definition. 
The fact of existence calls to mind that God is unique. In The Ethics, Spinoza 
maintained that: “there cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same 
nature and attributes” (47). 
God, as the ultimate and sole substance, is not determined in his actions by any other 
being or substance; and is, therefore, free. Nonetheless, God produces the entire order of finite 
things (Ian, 220). Necessary as the result of the infinite perfection of the divine attributes: God 
cannot either refuse to produce the order of finite things or produce another, different order. 
Spinoza’s God is not, after all, transcendent and “other." God is nature itself and necessarily 
expresses His perfection in the perfect modification, arrangement, and disposition of His 
attributes in and through the diversity of the finite order. 
 
SPINOZA’S PSYCHOLOGY  
Worthy of philosophical interrogation is Spinoza’s psychology. His determination 
makes him insist that human conduct should be studied just the same way as natural 
phenomena and thus follows nature’s definite laws. This is why E. M. Curley according to 
Nwaorgu (33) points out that, “most recently (Spinoza) has been interpreted as a philosopher 
of science on a grand scale, giving metaphysical expression, within a fundamentally cartesian 
framework, to the idea of unified science.” 
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This conviction also made him write his main book Ethics. To him, only ignorance 
makes us believe that we are a kingdom, that is to say, we do not follow the natural order or 
imagine that we can influence our behaviour. He states: “most writers on the emotions and 
human conduct seem to be treating matters outside nature rather than natural phenomena 
following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated as a kingdom 
within kingdom” (170). 
The import of this rendition is that, to deny that human behaviour could be explained 
as any other natural phenomena are to deny the natural order which human beings exhibit. To 
imagine that one can control one’s action is to imagine that one controls nature rather than 
follows nature’s law. 
This is what makes humans bemoan whatever they consider as evil. Spinosa believes 
that a proper understanding of the laws of nature makes us grasp better our actions and 
thereby appreciate our shortcomings in the scheme of things. Spinoza according to Nwaorgu 
again submits: 
Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down 
to a flaw therein; for nature is always the nature's law 
and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and 
change from one form to another and everywhere and 
always the same; so that there should be the same 
method of understanding the nature of all things 
whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and 
rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy and so on, 
considered in themselves follow from the same necessity 
and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite 
causes, through which they are understood, and pass 
certain properties as worthy of being known as the 
properties of anything else… I shall consider human 
actions and desires in the same manner; as though I were 
concerned with lines, planes, and solids (34).  
Spinoza believes the origin of this misconception derives from the assumption that self-
preservation is the first law of nature. What informs this position is the belief that preserving 
ourselves is of paramount importance because we must exist to propagate the other virtues. 
This led human beings to conclude that whatever preserves life is good and whatever hinders 
life is evil. Spinoza observes this to be the origin of good and evil. As a result, humans started 
pursuing those things they considered pleasant because of their belief that they preserved life. 
In the same vein, they avoided those things which they thought to be painful because they 
hampered life. Spinoza states that this is the root of the passions and the emotions because 
people’s urges sometimes clashed. By way of example, what a person considers pleasant may 
be abhorred by another who considers it painful. Also, what a person considers desirable and 
wants to retain may be wanted by another person. Naturally, there arose the proclivity for 
people's interests in conflict. These conflicts gave birth to anger, hatred, envy, acrimony, 
rancor, bickering, and so on.     
 
SPINOZA’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY  
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Spinoza’s moral philosophy is derived from his metaphysics and psychology. He 
believes that everything emanates from a perfect God. In Spinoza’s converted conception of 
God, the deity has qualities of matter as well as those of mind; he is of the world, not apart 
from it; he is the impersonal, amoral, not a spirit who acts in freedom and justice, bestowing 
his unique guidance, love, and mercy on his separate creatures (O Connor, 190). 
Spinoza replaces the idea of dutiful, selfless love for God and man by one of 
contemplative pleasure. Spinoza identifies God with nature "of nature, all in all, is predicated" 
(192). Nature consists of infinite attributes each of which is perfect. And this is exactly 
equivalent to the definition usually given of God. 
According to Nwaorgu (34), Spinoza believes that everything emanates from a perfect 
and an infinite God and he concludes that evil does not exist. He maintains that we hold the 
notion of good and evil because of our distorted and fragmentary understanding of the laws of 
the universe. Good and evil are derivative of ignorance. Becoming knowledgeable reveals to 
man that all things are a function of God’s perfect essence, and all things come to be as a 
necessary logical consequence due to God’s inscrutable nature. For this reason, the 
uneducated man is mentally and morally weak. In his ignorance of the order of nature, he is 
subject to what happens to him or be at the whim of events. 
On the other hand, the knowledgeable man, realising that everything follows from the 
order of nature understands why everything does not agree with the emotions, thereby 
appreciating that everything flows from nature's law. To control his emotions and passions, he 
strives to understand the laws of nature more and more. This enables him realise that anything 
that happens could not have happened otherwise since it emanated from the unchangeable 
laws of nature. To imagine that something better could have happened is to believe that God is 
not perfect or to accept that some imperfect actions do emanate from God. 
A perusal of the foregoing points to the fact that Spinoza denies that God is the ruler 
of the universe, the king of the world, as God is regarded in traditional Judaism. He destroys 
the belief that God is a pure spirit who designed the universe; that he is set to separate from 
the things of the world, sitting high on the throne of a royal state far above the subject of his 
realm; that he is the moral legislator and accountant (accounting in accordance with the 
legislation) who, when He closes an account, assigns an everlasting fate in proportion to debt 
incurred and the credits obtained; that He is in the last resort unnamable, mysterious; and that 
our duty is, in the word of Pollock (43), to worship in humble silence the inscrutable sublimity 
of His secrets.  It was because of such traditional theism forthrightly declared, that Spinoza 
was excommunicated from the Jewish community and later condemned in the wider world as 
atheistical.  
Spinoza according to Hallet (211) sees man as the offspring of the world around him 
and as of no exceptional effectiveness in that world. He is little more than a shadow of a 
substance than a vein in a single leaf of a multifoliate plant than one blade of grass in a field 
that stretches on all sides on and on the horizon. Here Spinoza firmly allied himself with the 
naturalism of the school of Democritus and Epicurus. Man’s place is in the ordinary scheme 
of things, and the laws of nature are the laws of his nature. Only to man himself is man of 
particular significance in the universe. In reality, Spinoza sees man as having no special power 
over his natural neighbours. The belief of biblical man in their dominion over the fish of the 
sea, over the fowl of the air, and overall the earth; the belief that we are physically, 
                            GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 2(1) (2019) 
(DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491976) 
 
20 
 
metaphysically, and morally at the centre of the universe, dominating it; the belief that it has 
been made for our peculiar benefit – these beliefs Spinoza said are manufactured by fancy, not 
by reason. 
Spinoza attributes the origin of this flight of fancy to the fact that whatever we do was 
prompted by a conscious desire aimed at what was useful to us. So, we are interested in the 
uses of things; when we think we have discovered the uses either by observation or by 
introspective reflection on actions of our own that are similar to the things we seek to 
understand, our curiosity is satisfied. Our explanations are by final and not by efficient causes. 
Our desires themselves are explained by the purposes motivating them, because, Spinoza 
states, we are conscious of our wishes and appetites and are ignorant of their efficient causes. 
Ignorance of the causes of things is for Spinoza the reason why humans think of themselves as 
forming a separate state from the surrounding state of nature. 
In conformity with his naturalism, Spinoza denies the objective existence of good and 
evil; they are for him not properties but relations. Whatever is, has to be. He posits: “in nature 
there is nothing contingent; on the contrary, everything is determined by the necessity of the 
devine nature to be and to operate in certain ways” (Connor, 199). 
Hence all that occurs, occurs indifferently to the hopes and fears, and the judgments 
of humanity. For Spinoza, facts in themselves are neither good nor bad. They have natural 
properties, but no values. Values are relative to human desires. Although nothing is good in 
itself, nevertheless Spinoza holds that something may appear as good to somebody insofar as 
it is advantageous to him, that is as long as it assists his self-preservation and his self-
fulfillment. “By good I mean that which we certainly know is useful to us” (Connor, 199). To 
Spinoza, the term “good” is what is useful. In Joachim, he states that “there is nothing that we 
certainly know to be good or bad except that which truly leads to understanding or that which 
can impede us so that understanding is decreased” (199). 
Spinoza puts the various members of the population of knowledge into classes, 
ranking them as lower, middle, and upper class. This knowledge according to Connor (200) is 
the profanum vulgus of sensations and unreasoned or irrationally held beliefs. These he states 
are at the bottom of the hierarchy of knowledge because they are so closely allied to ignorance 
and errors, Spinoza looks down with contempt on this lowly sort of knowledge since it is so 
often mistaken, so easily misled, so quickly swayed, and put in doubt. The middle class of 
knowledge is through in mediate deduction. This proceeds from premises that are either 
axiomatically true or validly derived in the last resort, from axiomatic truth. Axiomatic truths 
are the primary truths about such fundamental concepts as mind and body, cause and motion, 
God substance and freedom; they have common or simple notions for their subject-matter. 
Spinoza maintains that knowledge obtained by reasoning is necessarily true. 
Spinoza denies the objective existence of falsehood since according to him it could 
mean a blemish in the divine nature “All things are in Him and so depend upon Him that 
without Him they can neither be nor be conceived.” Therefore, if falsehood were real, it would 
be the cause of it: a conclusion repugnant to the orthodoxy in Spinoza’s mind.        
The third and the highest kind of knowledge is what Spinoza calls “sienitia intuitiva” 
– intuitive knowledge. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain 
attributes of God, to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things. Spinoza affirms:  
the highest good of the mind is knowledge of God, and 
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the highest virtue of the mind is to know God. This kind 
of virtue consists in the progress towards the possession 
of adequate ideas of God and is called by Spinoza the 
intellectual love of God. The intellectual love of God is 
eternal and from it arises the highest possible peace of 
mind (Connor, 190). 
 
Spinoza believes that human misery and suffering; our tensions and contentions are due to our 
lack of self-understanding, to our failure to achieve adequate ideas. Contentment is 
proportionate to genuine knowledge, to clear and distinct ideas. The final purpose of life, the 
summum bonum, is the permanent attainment of the contentment in the highest possible 
degree. 
According to Spinoza, all suffering results from having inadequate ideas. He 
maintains,  “our mind acts at times and at times suffers in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it 
necessarily suffers” Connor (202). Thus, Spinoza links action to theoretical knowledge. The 
more we labour to understand, the more we strive towards the third kind of knowledge, the 
more we are accompanied by the intellectual love of God, so much the greater is our action 
and our contentment. Form this third kind of knowledge one can attain the highest possible 
peace of mind. 
Love according to Spinoza is joy attended by the idea of an eternal cause. The 
intellectual love of God is that intellectual enjoyment which is accompanied by the 
recognition of God as its cause. The search for knowledge is the essence of the mind. 
Accordingly, the satisfaction of that search brings with it the profound contentment that comes 
from the awareness of our actions, from the fulfillment of the innermost urges. The surest part 
of happiness according to Spinoza is the study of philosophy and meditation. Our true 
happiness is derived from within us, and this means external sources cannot be a part of any 
person’s true happiness. The root of our unhappiness Spinoza maintains is our slavish 
attachment to our passions and emotions. Happiness can only come by freedom, and true 
freedom is acquired by mastering the laws of nature. This Spinoza calls the intellectual love of 
God. This enables us to appreciate that we are just part of the universe, and must exist in 
consonance with the unchangeable laws of nature. Subjecting our lives to prayer then becomes 
unintelligible, repentance, fear, regret, expectations or miracles are acts of divine providence. 
 
AN EXAMINATION OF SPINOZA’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY  
Spinoza began his system with the definition of “substance” allowing but a single 
substance (God) to exist. Nwaorgu (35) points out that Spinoza’s view of morality runs 
contrary to the common man’s approach. This is to say it does not agree with human nature. 
Naturally, human beings sometimes reflect on their lives and regret and repent of their bad 
deeds. Consequently, any moral doctrine which teaches that we must be indifferent to all 
things and all events that happen to us does not take cognizance of human nature. 
Spinoza taught that whenever we say a thing is evil, it is because we considered it 
with ourselves. This does not hold. Any act of wickedness remains so whether considered 
concerning ourselves, other people or about the entire universe. The point Spinoza stresses 
here is that nothing is intrinsically good or bad in itself. Rather than say anything is good or 
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bad, we do so because of how it affects us. There is still an unsolved problem here; how did 
we get the notion of good and bad if they did not exist? 
Spinoza concerned himself so much with describing human behaviour. We say a thing 
is good for instance because it enhances life or we desire it, and evil when it hinders life or we 
do not desire it. However, what we desire is not necessarily good and what we do not desire is 
not necessarily evil. This means that human beings do not know what they want. Also, 
Spinoza believes that apart from abstaining from the pursuit of perishable things, humans 
should devote much of their time to meditation and the study of philosophy to enable them to 
possess a proper grasp of nature's laws.      
The controversy concerning fatalism, determinism, and freedom was not properly 
resolved. According to him, our problems are derived from our ignorance of the laws of 
nature. If we realise that whatever comes to be must come to be, then we would stop worrying 
ourselves. The question is, if everything were fated and determined, this would include our 
dispositions. Thus, if it is our fate to believe that certain events could have happened, then 
nothing can change that attitude. Also, if it is the fate of some people to be unhappy whenever 
they have cause to accept that some events affected them unfavourably, then that cannot be 
changed. This doctrine also leads to difficulties regarding sin. Some critics have contended 
that if everything followed from the inscrutable nature of God, then it would be extremely 
difficult to explain the notion of sin. It has been pointed out for instance that the act of some 
people does not agree with the accepted view of rightful acts. Also, does it mean that God can 
request something from Himself and deny himself that thing; or that God can kill Himself, say 
when one person kills another? 
Spinoza’s ethical theory completely lacks the notion of justice and obligation. Since 
all occurrences in the universe follow from the immutable laws of nature, and the future is as 
fixed as the past, it means we cannot do anything to change our actions. This implies that all 
human beings' actions, good or evil, are not derived from them. All human actions can, 
therefore, be said to be amoral, which is not possessing any moral worth. By way of example, 
there is no difference, morally speaking, between the honest man and the liar or the thief. 
There is no criterion to determine what is morally acceptable and what is morally 
reprehensible. In Spinoza’s opinion our ethical problems are derived from our ignorance of 
the laws of nature. This seems a questionable assumption. It is erroneous to assume that 
mastering the causal relationship among events in the universe necessarily leads to equanimity 
or rest of mind. One can understand these natural laws without changing his disposition 
towards the occurrences of events. This runs counter to Spinoza’s claim that everything is 
immutable and fixed.      
Spinoza sees human happiness through a rational understanding of its place within it. 
On account of this and the many other provocative positions he espouses, Spinoza remains an 
enormously controversial figure. For many, he is the harbinger of enlightened modernity who 
calls us to live by the guidance of reason. For others, he is the enemy of the traditions that 
sustain us and the denier of what is noble within us. 
Spinoza claims that one substance (God or Nature) has an infinite number of 
attributes. Consequent to the above statement, several scholars have found it hard to 
understand what one substance could have multiple attributes each of which is “what the 
intellect perceives as constituting its essences, or that the attributes are not really the essence 
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of the substance but only seem to be.  
 
EVALUATION/CONCLUSION 
Our discourse on Spinoza's moral philosophy dealt with three distinctive matters. It 
began with his metaphysics and moved into the psychology of passion and will and finally, it 
set forth ethics based on the preceding metaphysics and psychology. The ethical theory of 
Spinoza does not take cognizance of moral responsibility. This should form the superstructure 
of all ethical doctrines. To ignore it is to undermine one's moral theory. It is so because human 
actions are ethical or unethical to the extent that the moral agent is held responsible for his 
action. But for Spinoza, God thus evolves into "nature" and "spirit" so that God becomes both 
a thinking and an extended being. Also, this paper aligns with Nwaorgu (40) who states that to 
accept Spinozean moral philosophy will mean that institutions such as law courts, prisons, the 
police force, and religious faiths like Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc are superfluous. They 
are irrational and cannot be said to be serving any useful purpose. There would be no 
justification whatsoever to allow law courts because it would be extremely difficult to justify 
their decisions; what will they be based on? The saints and the criminals are both carrying out 
functions assigned them by nature or God. So what constitutes the rationale to punish one and 
leave the other? The same argument goes to prisons. If some people must be put under lock 
and key for what they did not cause; how can anybody call that justice? If it is anything, it is 
an injustice. Also, the police force which is supposed to maintain law and order cannot be 
rationally justified. How can we determine what constitutes a breakdown of law and order? 
What is the touchstone used to declare one person’s actions unlawful and other person’s 
lawful? The case of justifying some religious faith will even be more difficult. This will mean 
either hell does not exist as they claim and teach, or their so-called benevolent God is certainly 
the contrary. This is because everybody is supposedly carrying out his orders, and thus it 
would be difficult to justify why some people should be punished for doing this. 
In line with the views expressed above the question becomes apt: if all things have 
their origins in a God which is infinite and perfect, how can evil exist? For evil to exist, it 
must either pertain to God or it does not pertain to God. If it pertains to God, then he is not 
infinite, and if it does not pertain to God, then where? Again, it presupposes that God is not 
infinite either way. 
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